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The first explicit proof of the so-called “fundamental theorem of arithmetic,” 
the uniqueness of the factorization of a natural integer into a product of primes, is 
generally attributed to Carl Friedrich Gauss [Gauss 1801, Second Section Sect. 
16]-see for instance [Boyer 1968,551] or [Bourbaki 1960, 110-I 111. On the other 
hand, several historians of mathematics have attempted to consider what might 
count as evidence that an author, a school, or a given period knows one formula- 
tion or another of this theorem and/or fully masters its consequences [l]. In this 
context, it may be of some interest to draw attention to some results published by 
Jean Prestet in his 1689 Nouveaux Elemens de Mathematiques. To make the 
discussion clearer, I will begin by discussing those theorems which seem to have 
gone, if not completely unnoticed, at least unappreciated [2]. Afterward, I will 
consider the context of Prestet’s work and try to delineate some aspects of the 
history of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic. 
I. PRESTET’S RESULTS 
The results of interest come from the sixth chapter (“Livre”) in the first volume 
of [Prestet 16891, which is devoted to the general division of magnitudes. The 
author gives several definitions analogous to the ones in Book VII of Euclid’s 
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Elements, such as divisor, common divisor, simple or prime number, compound 
number, etc., then some obvious corollaries, and the following theorem: 
Theorem: If two numbers b and c are relatively prime, their product bc is the least number 
that each of them can divide exactly and without remainder [“au juste et saris reste”]. 
The proof comes from a down-to-earth, explicit version of the Euclidean algo- 
rithm. As corollaries of this theorem, one finds: 
Corollary III: I f  d measures exactly a product bc of two numbers b & c and if c and dare 
relatively prime; the number d is a divisor of the other number b. For c & d being relatively 
prime & each of them measuring exactly the product bc, their product cd which is the least 
number that each of them can measure rightly is a divisor of bc. I f  then e is the integral 
exponent [i.e., the quotient] of the division of bc by cd, the number bc is equal to the product 
cde of the divisor cd by the exponent e. And if one divides each of them by c, the exponents b 
& de are equal or are one and the same number. But if one divides de by d, one will have the 
integral exponent e. And so d is a divisor of the number de or b. 
An example is given with this statement: 
d bc b c cd e 
4 84 12 7 28 3 
cde de 
This result is followed by a succession of corollaries whose object is to exhibit all 
the divisors of a number expressed as a product of prime factors. I will just 
indicate the outlines of this sequence and give the complete statement (including 
its proof) only in the simplest case. 
Corollary IV: If  two different numbers n & b are simple, every divisor of their plane, or 
product nb, is 1, or a, or b, or ab. For calling z any such desired divisor of the plane number 
ab, if the numbers a and z are relatively prime, the number z will be a divisor of the simple 
number b, that is to say 1 or b, which are the only divisors of the simple number b. 
1 2 3 6 1 2 3 6 
1 a b ab 1 a b ab 
Z Z 
And if the numbers a and z are relatively compound, the simple a will be a divisor of z. And 
calling y  the integral exponent of the divisor of z by a, the product ay is equal to the number z 
& also measures ab, of which z is a divisor. And calling then x the integral exponent of the 
division of the number ab by ay or z, the product ayx is equal to the number ab. And dividing 
ayx & ab by a, the exponents yx and b are equal or are one and the same number. And 
consequently 1 & b, which are the divisors of b, are also the only divisors of the number y.~. 
And so the divisor y, which is integral, is necessarily 1 or b, & ay, or z its equal, is the simple 
number la, or the plane number ab. So if two numbers a and b are simple, every divisor of 
their plane ab is one of the four 1, a, b, ab. 
1 2 3 6 1 2 3 6 
1 a b ab 1 a b ab 
Y z x wx X Y z 
YX YX 
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In corollaries V and VI, Prestet gives the analogous statements for a product of 
three different simple numbers (“solid”) and of four simple numbers (“super- 
solid”), then five, and so on, as he says, infinitely. He resumes all this in the 
following corollary: 
Corollary VII: The plane of two simple numbers, or the solid of three, or the sursolid of 
four, or the product of several, cannot have any simple divisor except the unit, or one of the 
two, or one of the three, or of the simple four, etc., of which it is supposed to be the product. 
In the first cases, Prestet gives the complete list of the divisors; he notices 
that they correspond to the different possible combinations of the simple factors 
one by one, two by two, etc. He turns then to the powers of the same prime 
number 
Corollary VIII: I f  the number a is simple, every divisor of its square aa is one of the three 1, 
0, aa. And every divisor of its cube a3 one of the four I, a, a’, a3, (. . .). And so with the 
others to infinity. 
and concludes with the following Corollary IX: 
Corollary IX: If  the numbers a & b are simple, every divisor (of) aab of the three a, a, b is 
one of the three 1, a, aa or one of the different products of these three by b; that is to say, one 
of the six 1, a, aa, lb, ab, aab. Because all the alternative planes [i.e., obtained by multiply- 
ing the different factors two by two] of the simple a, a, b are aa & ab. [Analogous statements 
for aabb; aabbb; aab3cc; aab3ccd]. And so with the others. 
In spite of what might appear to a modern reader to be a clumsy and too 
restrictive or too vague formulation, this result, that a number factorized into 
prime factors has for divisors the precise ones given by this factorization, is of 
course equivalent to the uniqueness of the prime factorization. Let me make some 
brief comparative remarks on the steps of its proof. 
The fundamental point here is Corollary III (=“Gauss’s theorem”); it guaran- 
tees the independence of the simple factors from the point of view of divisibility 
and then allows one to find the divisors by a purely combinatorial argument. It is 
remarkable that Prestet presents this chapter in the introduction as a mere applica- 
tion of Chapter 5 on combinatorics. In all cases, he makes precise the number of 
divisors one gets of each type-each type being composed of a given number of 
simple factors-by using combinatorial arguments and the entries of “Pascal’s” 
arithmetical triangle, all of them explained in the fifth chapter. In Gauss’s book, 
by contrast, “Gauss’s theorem” appears as a consequence of the uniqueness of 
the factorization, see [Gauss 1801, Sect. 191; this uniqueness is itself proved by 
using only a particular case of Prestet’s Corollary III: “if a prime number divides a 
product of two factors, it divides one of them”, [Gauss 1801, Sect. 14 (and 15 for 
its generalization to several factors)]. This last statement is far from new and is of 
an elementary nature in the strictest sense, for it is Proposition VII, 30 in Euclid’s 
Elements [3]. It is worth noting that, in Euclid, this proposition even precedes the 
proof-in VII, 31 and 32-that every number has a prime divisor (the first step 
towards the existence of the factorization into prime factors). Gauss uses Proposi- 
tion VII, 30 to show that two factorizations of a number must contain the same 
prime factors. 
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Of course, this significant inversion in the steps of the two proofs accompanies 
and underlines precisely the difference in the aims: Gauss wants to prove the 
uniqueness of the factorization, Prestet to settle more firmly his search for all 
divisors. A related change concerns the computation of the least common multi- 
ple; in [Gauss 18011, it follows the question of the factorization, but in [Prestet 
16891, a particular case of it, that of two prime factors-a part of the proof of 
Euclid’s Elements VII, 34-is used to prove Corollary III. 
Prestet uses these results in the remainder of the chapter to solve different 
problems such as finding all the divisors of a given integer, computing the number 
of divisors of a given number, or determining the common measure of two num- 
bers. He also explains the notion of a perfect number and proves the Euclidean 
construction for these numbers. But the aim of this chapter, as he says in the 
Introduction, is, above all, to serve as background for the sequel devoted to 
proportions [4]. 
It was certainly a commonplace in the seventeenth century to decompose an 
explicitly given number into its prime factors and then use this factorization to test 
for amicability or investigate the sum of divisors. It was certainly not common to 
theoretically justify this practice by making a theorem of it and proving it [5]. 
Dickson, for once, does not do Prestet fair justice in his chapter on divisors 
[Dickson 1919/1923 I, 51ff]; he quotes John Kersey (see [Kersey 1673 II 8,192ff]) 
and John Wallis (see [Wallis 16851, Chap. III of “A Discourse of Combinations, 
Alternations, and Aliquot Parts”) as giving the general rule for the number of 
divisors of an integer. He then writes that “Prestet notes that a product of k 
distinct primes has 2k divisors,” but asserts that Prestet did not give any general 
formulation. While it is true in the strict sense that Kersey and Wallis state how to 
compute the number of divisors in the general case (in a purely rhetorical form)- 
which Prestet fails to make explicit satisfactorily in his Corollary IX-, neither 
Kersey nor Wallis prove anything; indeed they do not even seem to be aware that 
something has to be proved, an essential difference from Prestet! 
Whatever our modern reservations may be concerning his presentation, Prestet 
clearly felt a need which was not shared by his contemporaries, nor even by his 
immediate successors: that of explicitly proving the relationship between any one 
factorization of a given number into primes and all its possible divisors. Though 
this may appear obvious to us, it was not so in Prestet’s time. One must investi- 
gate the context of his work to find some explanations for this peculiarity. 
II. PRESTET’S LIFE, WORK, AND STYLE 
Our knowledge of Prestet is rather scanty; for this section I have drawn upon 
papers by Andre Robinet ([Robinet 1960, 19611) to which I refer the curious 
reader [ 61. 
Jean Prestet was born in Chalon-sur-Saone (France) in 1648. He belonged to the 
circle surrounding Nicolas Malebranche [7], first as his servant, then his pupil, 
from 1670 until the publication of the first edition of the Elemens de Muthe’mati- 
ques [Prestet 16751. This book, the work of a young man studying under Male- 
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branche’s influence, appeared at the same time as the latter’s La Recherche de la 
V&rite’, and it is widely accepted that the ideas of Malebranche were decisive for 
(at least) the writing and the main emphasis. Reciprocally, Prestet’s book of 1675 
provided part of the mathematical support for Malebranche’s Recherche. The 
Efemens were widely diffused [8]. From 1675 to 1680, Prestet prepared for the 
priesthood in the Oratoire and was then sent to different towns to teach mathema- 
tics. He seems to have spent a large part of his time in rewriting his book [9] and 
died some months after the publication of his Nouveau Elemens, on June 8,169O. 
Like the first version, the second is mainly concerned with arithmetic and 
algebra, but is much longer, including new matter such as the extended properties 
of combinations and divisors mentioned above, and also, in the second volume, 
Diophantine problems treated by a systematic use of Cartesian algebra. This 
second version is, without doubt, Prestet’s work alone. The explicit pedagogical 
views he expressed in the Introduction could have been influential in the writing, 
especially the preoccupation with explaining accurately and in great detail what 
might seem well known facts [IO]; but one may also consider other plausible 
justifications to explain Prestet’s insistence on divisibility results. 
The first point to emphasize is the importance, for the Malebranchist group, of 
arithmetic and numbers in mathematics, contrary to the predominant view in the 
seventeenth century and a principal point of divergence from the original Carte- 
sian point of view-see [Hobart 1982, 46ff.l. The most commonly adopted per- 
spectives at that time were geometrical (possibly in an analytical mould) and, 
more and more, purely analytical, including, at the end of the century, the first 
sketches of calculus; arithmetical problems did not appear basic (except in an 
elementary manner, if one looked to practical and commercial training). 
For Malebranche (and Prestet), on the other hand, geometry made an essential 
use of the notion of proportion and, as such, depended strongly on numbers; 
arithmetic was the most exact of the sciences, based on the most exact of ideas, 
such as the idea of number. One knows more exactly V% or V’% than the line 
subtended by a right angle whose sides are 2 and 2, or 2 and 4, insisted Male- 
branche and Prestet. The question of divisibility appeared especially as a basic 
notion that was to be made precise. Algebra, particularly Cartesian algebra, was 
certainly the favorite computational and heuristic tool [Ill; the main operations 
Prestet introduced in his books had to be valid not only for ordinary numbers but 
also for symbolic expressions-he defined, for instance in [Prestet 16891, a simple 
magnitude, the symbolic counterpart of a simple number, which is a literal or 
linear magnitude, such as a or a + b. An important consequence connected with 
our subject concerns the use of letters (in an algebraic and not Euclidean manner) 
in arithmetical questions [12]; his firmer grasp enabled Prestet to apply directly 
combinatorial results: prime numbers appear exactly in this context as indepen- 
dent letters composing all the numbers. 
The first version had been criticized by several mathematicians, including Leib- 
niz [ 131, and the development of the combinatorial part in the second version may 
reflect Prestef’s response to the Leibnizian emphasis on a deeper level than the 
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arithmetical-the symbolic (or characteristic) one. Nonetheless, [Prestet 16891 
appears mainly as a development, with some concessions to his critics, of the 
Malebranchist trends already expressed in a briefer manner in [Prestet 16751: the 
preeminence of arithmetic should give access to proportions and general magni- 
tudes, and potentially to every other subject, as illustrated by the new example of 
Diophantine Analysis. 
The Nouveau Elemens did not enjoy a great success [14]. Moreover Male- 
branche at that time had begun to change radically his approach to mathematics to 
one which included the analysis of infinity, under the influence of Leibniz, L’Ho- 
pital, Johann Bernoulli, and others (see [Robinet 19611, [Robinet 1970, Chap. 1 & 
21 and also [Malebranche 1962-1970 XVII]). From the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the efficiency of their work and of the new calculus in solving several test 
problems (computations of centers of gravity and of volumes, treatment of geo- 
metrical “loci,” Diophantine analysis itself, etc.) contributed in an essential man- 
ner to the neglect of the approach initiated by Malebranche and maintained by 
Prestet. 
Prestet’s second version contains no spectacular new result on the subjects he 
wrote about, for instance amicable or perfect numbers. Neither was its author 
really interested in number theory as studied by Fermat or even Frenicle; his 
Cartesian predilections probably would have only hampered him in this regard. 
He is sometimes credited as the “discoverer” of the eighth perfect number, 
230(23’ - 1) = 2,305,843,008,139,952,128, but this was already known before him 
[15]. His project, it seems, was essentially foundational, and aimed to highlight 
and even reinforce interest in an approach which was then under attack. But these 
foundations were not considered convincing and/or useful by most of his contem- 
poraries; favourable remarks on Prestet’s book were even cut out in the new 
edition of Malebranche’s La Recherche de la VPritP in 1700 (see also [Robinet 
1960]), and the third volume of [Prestet 16891 was never published, [Malebranche 
1962-1970 XIX, 6191. To the group around Malebranche, and other influential 
mathematicians, Prestet’s work looked like a rearguard action. 
III. FORERUNNERS AND COMPARISONS 
At this stage, I think it legitimate to ask the question: why should it be interest- 
ing to exhume Prestet’s statements? The search for a mythical “first appearance” 
of a statement in and of itself might appear a sterile and naive exercise. Prestet’s 
book of 1689, and especially the first volume with which I have been concerned 
here, was not widely influential, and has passed unnoticed by most mathemati- 
cians (and historians of mathematics). With no spectacular result, no important 
methodological advances, it appears more or less as a dead end. It is not even 
clear that Prestet’s book contributed in any sense to the popularization of opera- 
tional symbolic notations in arithmetic, since these already were currently used by 
people like Schooten or Leibniz. As far as one can judge, Prestet did not contrib- 
ute to a tradition. But his work could still be useful as a basis for comparative 
studies, and I would like to suggest here some possibilities. 
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First of all, Prestet’s proof could be used to examine more carefully Euclidean 
presentations of arithmetic. The basis for Prestet’s study was clearly Euclid’s 
Elements, and he explicitly stated that his interest in detailing divisibility was the 
study of proportions. But he also employed a general notion of multiplication for 
several numbers (“product”, as he said!), not only for two or three as Euclid, and, 
above all, he utilized an operational literal notation for this notion. A structural 
study and comparison with [Mueller 19811, for instance, may throw some light on 
the consequences of this latter fact. As far as the fundamental theorem is con- 
cerned, Prestet used it to study divisibility in proportions and progressions (analo- 
gous to IX, 12 of Euclid’s Elements: “If any number of numbers are continuously 
proportional from a unit, the number next to the unit will be measured by what- 
ever prime number the last is measured by” (Mueller’s translation)) and to prove 
that if a square multiplied by a number is a square the number itself is also a 
square, or analogous statements. The proof of these statements in the original 
Elements is based on the fact that coprime numbers are the least in a given 
proportion (VII, 21). It is noteworthy that Proposition IX, 14, described by Heath 
as a first step toward the uniqueness of prime factorization, is not used in the 
remainder of the Elements (as shown in [Mueller 19811) contrary to the strategic 
role of the full result in Prestet’s work. 
The style of our author also strongly suggests the possibility of a comparative 
study with the Arabic point of view for the same sorts of problems [16], for 
instance with the treatise of the mathematician al-Farisi (see [Rashed 19831 and 
[Brentjes 19901); Proposition 6 in al-Farisi’s treatise corresponds to Corollary IX 
of Prestet. We find here roughly the same stress on divisors (and not the explicit 
uniqueness of the factorization), the same possibilities for notation and combina- 
torics. The aim in Prestet’s case, to firmly ground the computation of proportions, 
seems to me different from the Arabic case, where the application in view is 
research and proofs about amicable numbers. The latter would have certainly 
guaranteed a better audience for the work (in any case, it would have been difficult 
to do worse. . .): as far as problems involving numbers were concerned, concrete 
explicit results were viewed much more favourably than purely abstract ones. The 
logical organization of lemmas, results, and corollaries, as indicated in the first 
part of this paper in the case of Prestet and Gauss, may furnish the first step 
toward a more precise understanding of these different points of view. A further 
comparison might be used to distinguish specificities and methods in the work on 
numbers and make clearer the intertwinings in both cases between combinatorics 
and divisibility problems. One might also inquire about the equivalence of Pre- 
stet’s or al-Farisi’s statements on the uniqueness of the factorization into primes: 
we now know, of course, that these results are all mathematically equivalent, but 
would they have appeared as such to the authors themselves? In the seventeenth 
century, at least, the practice of writing a number as a product of primes (numeri- 
cally, and, in Prestet’s book, literally), the use of Corollary IX, and analogous 
results in proofs on proportions and progressions make this equivalence probable 
H71. 
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Another question concerns the remainder of the story. In the eighteenth cen- 
tury, literal notations were trivialities and the uniqueness of factorization for 
integers seemed transparent. Authors-for instance [Euler 17701 and also [Legen- 
dre 18301 (whose first version, Essai sur la The’orie des Nombres, appeared in 
1798)-did not comment on it, not even allusively, but made constant use of it. It 
was clearly directly against this trend (and not against mere ignorance of the facts) 
that Gauss fought in his Disquisitiones, and the people he quoted were Euler, 
Lagrange, Legendre, not, of course, Prestet. Gauss rightly noticed that the exis- 
tence of a decomposition is an evident consequence of “the elements,” but its 
uniqueness had to be proved; Legendre, even in 1830, would do exactly the 
opposite, that is, justify the decomposition and use the uniqueness without com- 
ment, see [Legendre 1830, 5ff.l. It is not clear to me if the need that Gauss 
expressed for a proof came from more than a particularly lucid care for founda- 
tions. Of course he was to establish in the case of Gaussian integers the unique- 
ness of factorization into prime factors, and he was influential in the subsequent 
work of the German school in number theory, but had he, as early as 1800, an 
awareness that problems arise when complex numbers enter the story? In any 
case, the first construction of ideals by Kummer at the end of the first half of the 
nineteenth century put the emphasis on divisors-once more, the question is not 
to seek for an unknown forerunner. Kummer’s inspiration was certainly Gauss 
and Jacobi, not Prestet! Nevertheless, might it not be instructive to look forward 
to the nineteenth century and inquire whether this stress was also here a compan- 
ion to a combinatorial interest of some kind? 
IV. DEAD ENDS 
As I have already indicated, Prestet’s book appears more as an end than a 
beginning. Such a dead end, especially when it directly concerns a result now 
considered important, can lead to comparative studies and raises interesting ques- 
tions. What criteria are necessary for a theorem to be regarded as proved? When 
did a mathematician feel the necessity to prove a result? In which cases does a 
result occur as a landmark for a new trend in research and stimulate it, and in 
which cases does it appear as a sterile defense of some established facts? Consid- 
erations such as these regarding Prestet’s proofs lead to questions about mathe- 
matical means of course, but also about shared interest in a community and the 
choice of motivating problems. 
A mathematical statement should be appreciated in its context: it could be a 
dead end at one time-and reappear in an equivalent form later for other reasons 
and with other perspectives before it. For us, Gauss’s fundamental theorem of 
arithmetic might seem a first light in a fascinating new country because we are 
now conscious of the far from trivial link between the Euclidean algorithm and the 
factorial property (which, however, was not explicitly clear, in Gauss’s treatise, 
partly because of the presentation in terms of congruences) and above all, of the 
difficulties in factorization when one extends the type of numbers to be consid- 
ered. But, we also know that Prestet’s Corollary IX did not increase its author’s 
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fame: as Prestet’s story reminds us once more, the prestige of a theorem, when 
applied backwards in time, is a mere creation of the historian. Even if only for that 
lesson, I cannot share the dismissive judgment of the second version of Prestet’s 
book. 
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NOTES 
1. See [Heath 1926/1956 II, 4033 and the accurate commentary at the end of 2.1 in [Mueller 1981, 
83]-one can find in [Rashed 1983, 276ffl a report on the controversies about a Euclidean version of 
the fundamental theorem; for the Islamic world, see for instance [Rashed 19831 and [Brentjes 19901. 
2. Of course, Prestet is known to historians of seventeenth century and Diophantine analysis. See 
for instance [Dickson 191911923 I, 15 & 521, and also several papers by Lucas and Boncompagni in 
Bullettino di Bibliografia e di Storia delle Scienze Matematiche e Fisiche 10 and 11; J. Itard mentions 
his name in various occasions and particularly in connection with “Gauss’s Theorem” (=Corollary III 
below) in [Itard 1961, 113 (and 121)] and [Itard 1963, 221. 
3. It is also proved as a basic’result in [Legendre 1830, 31. 
4. Ce trait6 (=Livre VI) est tres necessaire pour avoir dans la suite une idee bien Claire de ce qu’on 
nomme proportions et progressions geometriques. 
5. See for instance [Goldstein 19891 for further remarks on the practice of number theory in the 
seventeenth century. Links between combinatorics and number theory, roughly speaking, occur ex- 
plicitly in Pascal’s and Leibniz’s work, for example-see below for possible impact of Leibniz on 
Prestet-but neither published a treatise on these questions. The case of Frenicle is even more 
noticeable, because he combined strong interests in combinatorics and numbers and wrote a treatise 
including divisibility properties, the manuscript of which I was able to consult through the kindness of 
the Archives de I’Acadtmie des Sciences: there is apparently no proof of any sort of the fundamental 
theorem in it. 
6. Very useful also is the edition by Pierre Costabel of Malebranche’s mathematical papers: [Male- 
branche 1962-1970 XVII-21. See also [Henry 18791 and [Hobart 19821. 
7. [Johannes Prestet] qui apud Malebranchium agit egitue (who lives or lived at Malebranche’s 
home), as Leibniz wrote in a letter to Oldenburg in December 1675 [Leibniz 1976, 3301. 
8. Prestet’s book was well known and commented on (somewhat pejoratively) in the English group 
around Wallis and Oldenburg; cf. [Robinet 19601 and [Leibniz 1976, Briefwechsel mit Oldenburg]; it 
was also at the origin of the first contact of J.P. Crousaz, in Lausanne, with the Malebranchist group 
[Malebranche 1962-1970 XVIII, 2641. 
9. Prestet mentions in the introduction of [Prestet 16891 the existence of a second version of the 
Elements de Mathematiques, with which he was not satisfied and which was then never published. 
[Prestet 16891 is, in fact, a third version! 
10. In the Preface to his book, Prestet wrote: J’ai cherche a reduire les chases qui setvent de 
principe ou qui ont plus d’usage jusques au dernier degre de leur simplicite et a les etendre et pousser 
jusques au plus haut qu’il m’a et6 possible [. .I. Ce qu’on veut proportionner d l’intelligence de tout 
le monde doit avoir une brievete ou il ne manque rien, & une abondance ou rien ne soit supeflu. The 
subtitle of the first volume still insists on the same characteristics, an obedient neo-Cartesian echo of 
the demand for natural clearness: Premier volume [. . .] 02 tout est demontre darts un ordre nature1 et 
facile, et les chases expliquees plus a fond et poussees plus loin qu’on n’a fait jusqu’ici. 
11. L’Analyse, qu’on nomme ordinairement Algebre, sert merveilleusement d e’claircir, a etendre & 
d perfectionner l’tlrithme’tique meme & la geome’trie, Introduction of [Prestet 16891. 
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12. This notation, used since [Prestet 16751 was one of the few things Leibniz approved of in the 
book: Probo Arithmeticam per literas expositam; id enim poterit Arithmeticis reddere Symbolicam 
familiariorem [Leibniz 1976, 3301. (I approve of an Arithmetic presented by means of letters; it could 
make Symbolic (calculus) more familiar to Arithmeticians). 
13. Intus vero nonnisi Arithmeticam et Algebram reperies. [. .I. Caetera omnia pervulgata, et 
eorum quae vos expectastis, nihil. Praeterea. nullum Problema dificile solutum videbis. [Leibniz 
1976, 3301 (You will find only arithmetic and algebra (. .). Everything else is commonplace and there 
is nothing of what you expect. Moreover, you won’t see any difficult problem solved.). See also for 
instance [Malebranche 1962-1970 XVIII, 1441, where Leibniz asks Malebranche to push Prestet 
forwards into new analytic researches. Leibniz and Prestet had direct and indirect (through Male- 
branche and others) contacts together. 
14. See [Malebranche 1962-1970 XIX, 601 & 6191 about the difficulties in selling it. A third edition 
published in 1694 is sometimes mentioned which I have not been able to consult; it could be paradoxi- 
cally a new sign of the lack of success of the 1689 book, the practice of changing the title page to make 
a book appear to be a new one not being unknown at that time. 
15. It is true, as Lucas states in [Lucas 18781, that his list of perfect numbers is more accurate 
(except for the misprints. .) than most of the contemporary ones, but he quotes for instance 
2i56(2157 - 1) as a perfect number, which it is not: (2 i5’ - 1) has 4 prime factors, the least of which is 
852,133,201, well beyond Prestet’s reach in any case! Decomprime, a fast programme on Mac II due to 
Dominique Bemardi, needs 46 mn 32 s to find the complete decomposition. 
16. We have no evidence that Prestet knew directly of these works and every conviction that he did 
not: so I am not arguing about a direct influence or about priorities, but only suggesting a comparative 
study. 
17. See [Brentjes 19901 for counterarguments in the Arabic case. Of course, one should also take 
into account the choice of what is proved; see my comparative remarks above on Gauss’s and Prestet’s 
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